A new strategy against ISIL

Photo: Reuters

by Haluk Özdalga - In the face of brutal massacres and the territorial gains of the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL), US President Barack Obama recently outlined a “comprehensive strategy.” Under his plan, in brief, the Iraqi Army, Kurdish peshmerga and the moderate opposition militias in Syria, all operating on land, will finish off ISIL with the help of American airpower. This proposed military solution is based on an incomplete perception of the jihadist Salafis as being merely a fanatical mob of rebels.

Even in pure military terms, this strategy is insufficient. The present unprofessional Iraqi army, created after the Saddam-era one was disbanded by the US, is little more than an employment agency, as we saw through the repeated debacles it has suffered from ISIL forces since the end of 2013. Transforming the new Iraqi Army into an effective combat force in just a handful of months is a very tough task. As for the Kurds, they probably won't want to fight outside their own territory, for if they spread their forces out they could lose what they have now. In Syria, it is an illusion to believe that there may be a moderate opposition capable of defeating both Bashar al-Assad's army and the jihadist Salafis.
The so-called moderate opposition forces are poorly constructed, fragmented and lacking leadership. The majority of its combatants share the same jihadist Salafist ideology as ISIL. It is unrealistic to expect that these three disharmonious fighting forces could accomplish what the world's most powerful military, the US, was unable to achieve in Iraq against al-Qaeda over the span of eight years. In addition, ISIL is a much tougher force today than the al-Qaeda of a decade ago. This strategy seems like a precarious gamble because if applied persistently, ISIL might certainly take a heavy blow, but the whole region could fall into a chaos deeper than what we see today in Libya, one whose disastrous consequences cannot be foreseen.

However, the essential shortcoming of Obama's strategy is that it is out of touch with the underlying political reasons that gave rise to jihadist Salafism. One profound reason is that Middle Eastern Arab countries have so far tried many kinds of regimes -- including military, civilian, religious, secular and nationalist ones -- but all have failed to achieve political and social modernization. Surely this has much to do with the internal dynamics of these countries. But they have also lived almost incessantly under the crude interventions of Western powers. In the recent nearly decade-long occupation of Iraq, almost a million people were killed, thousands of young women and men were raped, and depleted uranium bombs melted and separated human flesh from their bones. Due to toxic explosives, Iraqi children are still being born deformed and handicapped. And all this suffering came from a war that was started for no apparent reason.

Moreover, bombs keep raining down on the people of Gaza, driven from their ancestral land, now trapped on a tiny strip of territory under inhuman conditions. The stealing of Arab land in the West Bank continues to this day. Libya and Syria have been transformed into infernos. In Yemen, unmanned aerial vehicles keep dropping bombs, killing many more innocent civilians than terrorists. This is called collateral damage. These are only a few examples from the 21st century. There seems to be no end to the humiliation Arab peoples suffer at the hand of the Western powers. If anyone thinks all this has nothing to do with the rise of ISIL, they are sadly mistaken.

War and violence lead to known consequences. Communities exposed to external aggression come to embrace and take refuge in the deepest values of their identity, like religion. On the other hand, as the intensity of war and violence escalates, moderates are eliminated and the center is destroyed, while fanatics and extremists enjoy ever-greater power. America paved the way to jihad for Salafis for the first time during the 1979 Afghan war. In terms of ideology and their tendency towards violence, the Afghan jihadists and the ISIL jihadists of today are cut from the same cloth. The century-old Sykes-Picot borders are now being changed in a brutal and bloody fashion, and jihadist Salafis can also be seen as one of the manifestations of Arab nationalism.

A new strategy


The deep crisis of today necessitates a truly comprehensive strategy. For a roadmap, six basic elements may be suggested:

1.The West must stop its power-and-violence-based interventions in the Middle East. It must stop raining bombs from the sky. The Middle East has deep problems, but they can hardly be resolved by Western military intervention. Military means may be employed only for truly humanitarian reasons. However, keep in mind how disgracefully this principle was abused in Libya.

2. The rise of jihadi Salafism is more of an issue for the Arab world than for the Sunni Muslim world. Therefore, it is primarily the responsibility of Arab countries to make efforts against it. An Arab cooperation against terrorist acts that threaten the Arab world must be forged, with sectarian emphasis kept at a minimum.

3. The project for regime change in Syria through outside military intervention has collapsed. Without Syria joining in the Arab cooperation, tackling the current crisis is nearly impossible.

4. The conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran is having devastating repercussions in every corner of the region. Both parties to the conflict have worthy points which deserve consideration. Reducing tension in the Saudi-Iranian conflict is essential.

5. For decades, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries have provided political and financial support for exporting Salafism. Their latest misconceived project was Syria, where Turkey chose to be a vital partner. But jihadist Salafists have broken free of Riyadh and are now the greatest threat to the Saudi regime. The export of Salafism from the Arabian Peninsula must cease.

6. The last but arguably most important point is resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a two-state formula. Achieving stability in the Middle East without this would be very difficult. The current obstacle to a two-state solution today is the unyielding resistance of Benjamin Netanyahu government. Removal of this resistance is highly unlikely without due pressure from the West.

And Turkey?


Ankara's refusal to take part in the military solution proposed by America was clearly the right decision. Turkey's interests are very closely linked to the present deep crisis, and while rejecting the US proposal, it should also have put an alternative comprehensive roadmap on the table. This was not done, which inevitably means that for now, Turkey will have to adopt a weak and unassuming posture.


However, even if it did come up with a strategy of its own (like the one we suggested here or a different one), its situation would hardly be very different. Because finding proper support for an alternative strategy requires a stronger place both in the West and in the Arab world. Today, Turkey has neither. Turkish democracy is severely compromised since both the judiciary and media freedoms are under heavy political tutelage, and corruption at the highest political levels is being covered up. Turkey is increasingly distancing itself from the West.

For example, for a strategy as proposed here, support from the West would be possible only if it were done from inside, remaining strong within the West. But under present conditions, this would most likely be perceived as fresh proof of ideological hostility against the West.

Turkey's relations in the Middle East have also hit rock bottom. It is now a party of the less-than-crucial Turkey-Qatar-Muslim Brotherhood axis and sharply reduced its position in the region. While borders are being redrawn and a profound transformation is taking place all around us, and its interests are being threatened, Turkey searches in vain to find an interlocutor from an Arab country of influence to even discuss its views. This is indeed a painful situation for those who long criticized previous Turkish governments for being passive in the Middle East.

*Haluk Özdalga is an independent member of Parliament.